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Concluding Observations 
 
Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens 
 
As we have analyzed the dynamics of territorial party politics in some significant West 
European countries, we wish to consider to what extent our findings support the theoretically 
informed expectations that were formulated in the introduction. Our concluding observations 
are formulated by linking them directly to the relevant hypotheses, and therefore may not 
respect the order of the empirical chapters in this book. 
 
[A] The ‘nationalization thesis’ reconsidered and the relationship between the 
regionalization of the state and the denationalization of the multi-level party system 
 
[B] Testing ‘nationalization’  
 
 In the introduction we did not criticize the empirical evidence presented by the most 
significant party system nationalization studies, but we raised two significant concerns. First, 
the ‘nationalization thesis’ is counterintuitive, especially for countries such as Belgium, 
Spain, Italy (and, following unification even Germany) which decentralized their state 
structures in recent decades. Except for Belgium, these are all large and populous West 
European states. Hence, a longitudinal and detailed study of the extent to which the (multi-
level) party systems of some of these states have (de)nationalized could shed a different 
perspective on the ‘party system nationalization thesis’ in Western Europe as a whole 
(Caramani 2004). Second, we argued that such a test would benefit if it were to study party 
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systems as ‘multi-level’ party systems and therefore also take results for regional elections 
into consideration. 
 Two contributions to this volume address these concerns in some depth. The first 
contribution, by Kris Deschouwer analyzed developments in the statewide party systems of 
Belgium and Spain. The federalization or regionalization of these states since 1980 is 
undisputable and in light thereof a denationalization of their statewide party system could be 
anticipated. Yet, Deschouwer does not find sufficient evidence to confirm this expectation. In 
Belgium, the Dutch and French-speaking statewide party systems, while noticeably different 
in the relative electoral strength of each party family member have not grown much further 
apart since the early 1980s (the outcome of the most recent federal election of 2007 
notwithstanding). A similar pattern was observed in Spain: the results for Spanish general 
elections have not become more de-nationalized. In fact, compared with previous statewide 
elections, the results for the last election to be included in the analysis (March 2004) are the 
most distinctive in just two of the seventeen autonomous communities. 
 Deschouwer’s observations are based on an analysis of developments in the statewide 
party system alone. Hough and Koß pursue a comparable exercise for the German case but 
also incorporate regional election results. Their paper serves two purposes: first to test 
whether German voters have displayed increasing regional differences in the party which they 
vote for in statewide elections (to test the nationalization thesis); second to analyze whether 
German voters increasingly display multi-level voting behavior, and by doing so reduce the 
second orderness of German regional elections. With respect to the first objective, both 
authors find sufficient evidence of de-nationalization: unlike in Belgium and Spain, the 
German statewide party system has denationalized after 1990, albeit that volatility patterns are 
much reduced if we consider movements within party blocs rather than between individual 
parties. With respect to the second objective, Hough and Koß find evidence of an increasing 
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‘de-coupling’ between statewide and Land elections: how a party performs regionally in 
statewide elections has become a less reliable predictor for how it will perform in the nearest 
Land election. Their findings suggest that German regional elections no longer display all the 
characteristics of second order elections: although there may be lower turnouts still and an 
increased tendency to vote for smaller parties in regional elections compared with statewide 
elections, regional voters may also become increasingly mobilized on regional issues.  
The analysis of the German multi-level party system raises three important questions: 
first: to what extent is the ‘de-nationalization’ of the German statewide party system a rather 
isolated phenomenon that can be attributed to unification? Is unification an important ‘critical 
juncture’ that strengthened the territorial heterogeneity of Germany in socio-economic terms, 
triggered more regionally diversified voting patterns in statewide elections and increased the 
extent of multi-level voting? The data show that unification intensified electoral volatility and 
reduced the evenness of regional support for the large statewide German parties, especially as 
a result of the success for the PDS in East Germany. Second, is this pattern set to continue or 
are we in fact witnessing a partial ‘Easternization’ of the West German party system, due to 
the electoral breakthrough of an all German Left Party and the narrowing gap between East 
and West German voters in terms of volatility, at least in statewide elections? In this sense, 
we could witness the stabilization or at least a partial ‘re-nationalization’of the German 
statewide party system in the short term? Finally, is the rise of multi-level voting replicated 
across those West European states whose statewide party systems have not become more 
denationalized (such as Belgium and Spain)? Although the contributions to this volume do not 
consider this last question, in recent years several authors analyzed the scope of ‘multi-level 
voting’ in the UK and Spain (Trystan, Scully and Wyn Jones 2003, Hough and Jeffery 2006b; 
Pallarés and Keating 2006). These studies demonstrate the presence of ‘dual’ and multi-level 
voting. However, in Spain the degree of multi-level voting varies considerably between the 
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autonomous communities and does not seem to have increased since the early 1990s (see 
Hough and Jeffery 2006b, Palláres and Keating 2006). Combining the evidence presented in 
this volume, and the analysis of regional electoral behavior mentioned above, it seems that a 
homogenization of electoral results in statewide elections does not frequently coincide with a 
heterogenization of electoral outcomes in regional elections. This statement remains to be 
tested among a much larger group of statewide and regional elections, but if true, it would 
undermine a key assumption of our introduction. 
 
[B] Developments in the Party System and Authority Migration 
 
 The contributions by Deschouwer, Hough and Koß enable us to assess the relationship 
between the migration of authority (centralization or decentralization) within the state and the 
(de)nationalization of the party system. Chhibber and Kollman’s work (2004) suggests that 
both aspects are directly related. The evidence presented in these chapters does not bear this 
out. In fact, the gradual process in which Belgium and Spain have become federalized or 
highly regionalized states is not paralleled by an equally spectacular denationalization of their 
party systems. Arguably, in Belgium the denationalization of the party system was already 
complete when the country took its first steps into federalizing the state. The break up of the 
statewide parties removed the most crucial mechanism for aggregating votes from the 
regional to the statewide level. Yet, after they had split, both parties of the same family (e.g. 
Flemish and Francophone Social-Democrats, Flemish and Francophone Christian-Democrats, 
etcetera) generally moved in similar directions while the state continued to decentralize. The 
2007 elections may be a turning point insofar as the difference between the Dutch-speaking 
and Francophone party systems is increasing. This could be a consequence of the uncoupling 
of statewide and regional elections since 2003, and especially the asymmetries in the party 
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political composition of the federal and regional governments. Similarly, in Spain, major 
shifts in the migration of authority to the regional levels occurred in the 1990s although the 
Spanish statewide party system did not become particularly more denationalized in that 
decade. Conversely, the denationalization of the German party system did not immediately 
generate a more decentralized federation, at least not in formal terms. Constitutional change 
did not take place until the formation of a federal ‘Grand Coalition’ (CDU/CSU-SPD) 
government in 2005. Overall, these findings suggest three important conclusions.  
First, there is no straightforward correlation between authority migration and party 
system nationalization: state decentralization can coincide with a stabilization or even relative 
nationalization of the (statewide) party system. Conversely, a denationalizing party system 
does not necessarily coincide with a decentralizing state at least not in formal or constitutional 
terms. For instance, while Detterbeck and Jeffery suggest that recent and pending 
constitutional reforms shift German federalism into a more decentralizing direction, not all 
parties that have contributed to denationalizing the party system (in particular the PDS) 
support, let alone, stand to benefit from a more denationalized federation. Furthermore, 
constitutional reforms take more time to register than shifts in electoral behavior, especially in 
a federation like Germany where the Länder can exercise a collective veto right in the centre 
through the Bundesrat and the federal majority parties do not necessarily capture a majority of 
seats in the second chamber. 
Second, the findings do not lend support to the assumed direction of the relationship 
between authority migration and the (de)nationalization of the party system. Changes in the 
structure of the state do not necessarily trigger changes in the party system, as Chhibber and 
Kollman have argued (Chhibber and Kollman 2004). In Belgium, the parties had almost 
entirely split before the state embarked upon a process of federalization, and in Spain too, the 
formative elections of the late 1970s and early 1980s immediately demonstrated the success 
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of autonomist parties. Therefore, in Belgium, an increasing regional divergence of electoral 
results and swings seems to have caused institutional regionalization and not the other way 
around. At least until 2007, institutional regionalization may have contained the further 
denationalization of voting in statewide elections. In Spain too, some of the autonomist parties 
have played an influential role in decentralizing the state, especially when the political 
opportunity structure to weigh on national politics was there, i.e. when a national minority 
government relied on their support. Progressive steps to further strengthen the powers of the 
Spanish regions may have prevented a further increase in their support or in the extent to 
which votes for statewide parties are spread homogeneously across the regions of the state 
and thereby contained rather than increased a denationalization of voting.  
Finally, the findings suggest that changes in the (de)centralization of the state or the 
(de)nationalization of the party system are often linked to broader societal developments 
which restructure the nature or change the relative importance of territorial cleavages. For 
instance, as Verleden illustrates in his chapter on Belgium, the decreasing salience of the 
ideological divide between Catholics and non-believers after World War II, coupled with a 
reversal of economic fortunes (now benefiting the Dutch-speaking Flemish population) gave a 
different meaning to long-standing Flemish demands for more cultural autonomy. The 
language divide became a more ‘attractive’ cleavage on which to mobilize support. The rise 
of new political agents (autonomist parties) prompted a (radical) response of the statewide 
parties. In turn, their break-up along linguistic lines and thereby also the breakup of the 
statewide party system as a whole paved the way for institutional reform, i.e. the institutions 
were adapted to the disintegration of the party system, which in turn was caused by structural 
changes in society. Deschouwer’s data nicely support this link between party systemic and 
state systemic developments: an increase in the regional divergence of electoral results and 
swings disintegrates the statewide party system. Yet, after adopting regional and eventually 
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federal institutional devices, centrifugal tendencies in the statewide party system are again 
contained (notwithstanding a more recent upsurge of electoral heterogeneity). Unification has 
had a similar heterogenizing effect on the German party system (though the state systemic 
repercussions are still bearing fruit) since it generated a much more territorially heterogeneous 
society in which the East-West divide trumped an already present (but much less salient) 
divide between the rich Lander of the South, and some relatively poor Lander of the North 
(again, a reversal of fortunes, compared with the immediate post-War period). However, we 
should also warn against over-emphasizing the impact of changes in the importance of 
(domestic) territorial cleavages alone. For instance, in Italy, the North-South cleavage has 
been present throughout, yet remained without much political salience until the beginning of 
the nineties.  This has changed drastically since then, although Italian society as whole had 
not become territorially more heterogeneous. The end of the Cold War, and the scandals 
surrounding the long term governing Christian- and Social-Democrats that triggered the 
implosion of the old party system, opened up a window of opportunity for the mobilization of 
electoral support along the territorial cleavage. The Lega Nord quickly filled this void.  
 
[A] Statewide Parties and the Challenge of Multi-Level Politics: Party Organization & 
Policy 
 
 Statewide parties provide by far the most important element of linkage between the 
statewide and the regional party systems. Therefore, the more successful these parties in 
garnering electoral support across the regions of the state in statewide and regional elections, 
the higher the integration of the party system.  
 In the section we focus on two important questions. First, to what extent are the 
organization, strategies and policies of the state-wide parties related to the processes of state 
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(de)centralization and party system (de)nationalization? Second, insofar as there is a causal 
link between each of these processes (party organizational adaptation, party system 
nationalization and state decentralization) in what direction is it running? Before we discuss 
some findings in more detail, we summarize the overall tendencies that were found for our 
cases.  
 First, if we focus on the relationship between the statewide party organization and 
state (de)centralization alone, we have good reasons to expect a relatively decentralized state 
structure to coincide with a relatively decentralized statewide party organization. For instance, 
statewide parties which operate in a federal context not only organize for regional elections, 
but also vie for a position in regional office. Regional office in federal or regionalized states 
comes with potential access to important policy or expenditure resources, and generally 
requires a class of highly professionalized politicians. Each of these properties (even if the 
regional party branch of the statewide party is not likely to be elected into regional office) 
should strengthen the autonomy of regional party branches and their influence in the statewide 
party branch. Or to paraphrase Van Houten’s ‘principal-agent’ paradigm, the higher the levels 
of territorial autonomy, the stronger the expected position of the ‘regional’ agent vis-à-vis the 
statewide principal.  
Overall, the support that we find for these assumptions is very mixed at best. On the 
one hand, it is perfectly possible to have a relatively decentralized state in which the statewide 
parties have maintained a more centralized character. Spain illustrates this trend. The 
decentralization of the state has been orchestrated by two rather centralized parties, the 
Conservatives (PP) in particular. Although regional party leaders gradually built up capacity 
at home and in the statewide party branch, the level of regional branch autonomy still falls 
short of what could be expected based on the importance of autonomous communities within 
the state. On the other hand, Belgium and the UK illustrate the opposite trend; that is a 
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relatively centralized state may coincide with decentralized parties. As Verleden demonstrated 
in his contribution, the Belgian statewide parties had already started to disintegrate well 
before the regionalization of the Belgian state. Similarly, until the 1950s, the Scottish 
Conservatives operated as an almost quasi-autonomous branch within the Conservative Party, 
despite the rather centralized character of the UK state.  
With regard to the second question, we observed that statewide parties not only 
respond to but also play an active role in shaping the territorial structure of the state. Indeed, 
statewide parties not only actively mould such reforms through processes of constitutional 
change, but they even hold their own organizational chart as a template against which to 
structure the territorial organization of the state. In this respect, Verleden’s analysis provides 
an intriguing account. He shows how the formerly statewide Belgian parties exported 
‘consociational mechanisms’ which served to bridge differences of opinion between the 
Dutch- and French-speaking party members to the institutional structure of the Belgian state. 
After the parties had split, these mechanisms lived on in structures that were devised to pacify 
relations between the Dutch- and Francophones within the still unitary Belgian state 
(Swenden and Jans 2006; Deschouwer 2006b). Hence, paradoxically, at the time when 
consociationalism was ‘cut and pasted’ onto the overall state-structure, the state-wide party 
system had almost broken down completely and the ‘consociational’ model had ostensibly 
failed as an instrument for accommodating intra-party territorial conflicts. In a similar vein, 
one may wonder whether one day the Consejo Territorial which advises the PSOE national 
president and party executive could serve as a useful template against which to model a 
reformed, and from the viewpoint of territorial representation, more significant Spanish 
Senate. 
In the following section, we will elaborate in further detail on the relationship between 
the territorial organization of the state, the organization of statewide parties and especially the 
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strength of regional party branches therein. We not only discuss the organizational properties 
of statewide parties, but also how they campaign and make policy.   
 
[B] The Territorial Structure of the State and How statewide parties organize and campaign 
 
The contributors to this volume were asked to consider whether the territorial 
organization of statewide parties reflects three distinct dimensions of how a state is structured 
territorially; first, the functional or jurisdictional method of distributing competencies in the 
state (where we expect the regional party branches to be more involved in statewide party 
matters but also to be more constrained in regional party matters, the more competencies are 
distributed in a functional way); second, variations in the scope of regional self-rule (where 
we expect the autonomy of the regional party branches to increase with the scope of the 
regional autonomy) and finally, the presence of constitutional asymmetry (where we expect 
the autonomy of the regional branches to be higher and/or their participation in the statewide 
party to be stronger for those regions that have a higher degree of self-rule). The collected 
empirical evidence supports a relationship between each of these factors and the territorial 
organization of the statewide parties, but not always as strong as predicted. We consider each 
of these three hypotheses in turn.  
 
[C] A jurisdictional or functional design  
 
For instance, with regard to the relationship between a functional/jurisdictional federal 
design, and the territorial structure of statewide parties, we notice that under Germany’s joint-
decision or integrated federal system, regional executive leaders acquired an unusually strong 
input in the governance of the centre, through the collective veto power of the Bundesrat, the 
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federal second chamber. In parallel, regional party leaders obtained a high degree of influence 
in statewide party matters, a pattern that is replicated across each of the statewide parties. 
Although not as ‘functional’ as the German model, the method of distributing competencies 
between the centre and the regions in Spain also requires a considerable amount of co-
operation between both levels. Likewise, devolution to Wales assumes a very high level of 
co-operation. Yet, in their comparative analysis Fabre and Mendéz-Lago note a lack of 
‘shared rule’ provisions in the case of most Spanish and UK statewide parties. This lack of 
systematically integrating regional party branches in statewide party decisions parallels a 
failure to incorporate regional elites in the functioning of the central state, either via highly 
institutionalized channels of intergovernmental relations or through an effective and powerful 
second chamber (Bolleyer 2006; Roller 2002). One could make a case that the decision of the 
Spanish Socialists to create an (advisory) Consejo Territorial in which regional party leaders 
advise the party president on matters of regional importance strengthens the shared rule 
dimension somewhat. The regional branches of the UK parties are even less involved in 
statewide party matters than the Spanish regional party branches. Arguably, the weight of 
Scotland and Wales in the union is so small, that a strong involvement in the central party 
executive or strategic policy committees cannot be realistically expected. On the other hand, 
the lack of primary legislative powers for Wales requires strong channels of intra-party 
coordination, for instance at present between Welsh Labour and the UK Labour Party. Such 
channels exist, but only informally. Finally, Hopkin shows how in Italy, regional branches, 
and especially regional party leaders in executive office (governors) increased their capacity 
to influence statewide party policy. This happened, despite decentralizing reforms that seemed 
to have disentangled somewhat – at least formally – the statewide and regional layers of 
policy making by entrusting the latter with ‘exclusive’ autonomy in a larger area of 
competencies (except for their financing). However, the larger role of regional policy leaders 
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in the centre is attributed less to the rise in regional autonomy than to the direct election of the 
governors and their capacity to play an important ‘brokerage’ role in the clientelistic networks 
connecting party elites at the central and local levels.  
The comparative contributions also demonstrate that regional branch participation in 
the state-wide party does not preclude a considerable level of regional party branch autonomy. 
Indeed, the substantial autonomy of the regional party branches in Germany contradicts our 
initial hypothesis that a highly co-operative or joint-decision making design implies a lesser 
degree of autonomy for the regional branches. The contribution by Detterbeck and Jeffery has 
shown that the degree of autonomy of the German regional party branches in selecting 
candidates, devising a party program for regional elections and determining regional coalition 
partners of their choice following regional elections is high notwithstanding their relatively 
strong participatory rights in the centre. Furthermore, the growing autonomy of regional party 
branches in recent years, is - at least for the time being – not offset by a parallel decrease of 
influence in the statewide party. Similarly, Ştefuriuc shows that German regional party 
leaders have not refrained from purposefully building or sustaining incongruent coalitions (i.e. 
coalitions that are different in composition from the coalition at the centre) when this was 
seen as benefiting the party in terms of policy or votes. For instance, in North-Rhine 
Westphalia, the CDU-FDP coalition remained in place, despite a federal coalition swap after 
the 2005 federal elections. Especially the NRW CDU perceived incongruence as an advantage 
that would shield the NRW coalition from unpopular federal decisions. 1A similar capacity of 
German regional party branches to withstand federal party pressure is also shown by Van 
Houten in his analysis of the negotiations on the federal Solidarity Pact (1993). He shows how 
Länder governments with very different party political composition utilized the Bundesrat to 
joined forces and ‘defeat’ the CDU led federal government. 
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In comparison, the Spanish example illustrates that weaker ‘shared rule’ provisions 
frequently coincide with lower levels of regional party branch autonomy. Overall, Spanish 
statewide party branches keep a closer eye on the process of candidate selection; they impose 
‘a framework program’ (‘programma marco’) for regional elections and constrain regional 
party branches in their freedom to form the coalition governments of their choice. As a result, 
Spanish regional party branches find it harder to stand up against the statewide party line,even 
if they operate in a context where the need to do so is arguably higher, due to the lack of 
institutionalized intergovernmental coordination mechanisms that effectively channel 
territorial interests into the centre (as specified above). It follows that in Spain regional party 
branches or regional parties attach more importance to forming coalitions that are congruent 
with the central government. For instance, Ştefuriuc shows how the regionalists of the 
Canaries (CC) always preferred a coalition with the governing party in Madrid, due to their 
dependence on bilateral co-operation with the centre on regionally important policies such as 
health, fiscal matters, water policy, regional development (EU Structural Funds) or asylum 
policy. Therefore, the CC decided to expel the PP from the regional government of the Canary 
Islands shortly after the PSOE had entered the central government in 2004.  
 
[C] The scope of decentralization  
 
With regard to the second aspect of state decentralization, we can confidently state that 
by and large, the larger the scope of regional competencies, the higher the autonomy of the 
regional party branches. We can observe this pattern by considering the development of 
regional party branch autonomy across time, or by comparing regional party branch autonomy 
between states with different levels of regional autonomy. The chapters discussing regional 
party branch autonomy in the UK, Spain, Germany and Italy demonstrate that the increase of 
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regional autonomy within each of these states was never paralleled by a significant decrease 
in regional party branch autonomy. More likely, decentralization increased the profile and 
resources of regional party leaders and thus gave them additional capital to fight against 
statewide party interference. However, what these contributions also show is that the effect of 
decentralization does not play out uniformly across all statewide party organizations and may 
not manifest itself immediately. It can take considerable time before changes in how the state 
is governed transform long standing party practices and rules. For example, notwithstanding 
the presence of a ‘federal’ tradition in Germany which predates the Weimar republic, 
Detterbeck and Jeffery show that it took the Social-Democrats a considerable amount of time 
before they came to terms with a federal state structure. In fact, is was not until the party 
reformed its internal party structures in the late 1950s or early 1960s that its party 
organization came to reflect the German federal state structure in which the party operates. 
Conversely, the CDU ‘traveled’ in the opposite direction: the statewide party branch was 
weaker initially, but, reflecting the role of the CDU as the dominant party in federal 
government until 1966, it gradually increased its leverage. This centralizing ‘trajectory’ more 
or less made the CDU and SPD look alike in terms of the relative strength of their regional 
party branches. A similar time-lag effect can be observed in Bradbury’s analysis of candidate 
selection for devolved elections in the UK. Prior to the first devolved elections in 1999, the 
statewide Labour party heavily intervened in the process of candidate selection as candidates 
were tested on the extent to which they showed loyalty to ‘New Labour’ party principles. 
Some of these practices back-fired electorally (especially in Wales). In light thereof the party 
was inclined to give regional party branches a freer reign in pre-selecting candidates for 
subsequent devolved elections, albeit that it could also more easily set loose due to the long 
lasting effects of its ‘gun-boat’ interventions in 1999. A comparable ‘institutional learning’ 
effect has been observed for the UK Conservatives which even adapted a ‘confederal’ 
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constitution in 2003 for streamlining UK-Scottish relations. In Spain too, the statewide party 
branches of PSOE and PP only ‘recognized’ the territorial organization of the state in recent 
years, especially by setting up Territorial Councils (PSOE) or Autonomous Councils (PP) 
with an advisory capacity.   
 
[C] Asymmetry 
 
Our contributions provide partial evidence to support the expected link between 
constitutional asymmetry and asymmetry in how statewide parties organize campaign or make 
policy. The evidence is most consistent for the UK, and especially for the Conservative Party. 
As Fabre and Mendéz-Lago demonstrate, the Scottish Conservatives are responsible for 
drafting ‘devolved’ parts of general election manifestos, whereas the British party devises 
matters in which Wales has obtained executive devolution leaving the Welsh party with 
autonomy to adapt the details of these policies to the Welsh context. The autonomy of the 
Scottish Conservatives in drafting manifestos for devolved elections is also higher than for the 
Welsh branch. Similar asymmetries were noted in the process of candidate selection, and 
again especially within the Conservative Party. In Wales the process of candidate selection for 
general elections is still supervised by a statewide election committee, while in Scotland a 
Scottish Candidate’s Board appointed by the Scottish Conservatives assumes this role. There 
is some evidence of asymmetry in the organization of the Spanish statewide parties as well, 
most notably in the peculiar position of the Catalan PSC and Navarrese UPN, both of which 
are semi-autonomous members respectively of the Spanish Socialist and Conservative 
families. However, apart from PSC and UPN, the other regional party branches are more or 
less treated in the same way, at least formally, even if some of them may appear under a 
different label in regional elections. Hence, the special status of the Basque Country or 
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Galicia (as historic communities) does not find special recognition in the structures of the 
leading statewide parties. Similarly, the asymmetric process of decentralization, especially 
during the first fifteen years of Spanish regionalism and again since 2005 did not produce 
more widespread asymmetry within the statewide party organizations. Likewise, in his 
contribution on the Italian statewide parties Hopkin does not make reference to higher levels 
of autonomy for those regional party branches which operate in regions with a special status. 
Sometimes, de facto autonomy of a regional party branch can be enhanced as a result of 
specific circumstances, for instance, the presence of a regional leader with high moral 
standing in the party (see further). Conversely, as Van Houten has demonstrated, the Spanish 
PSOE managed to turn the peculiar position of the Catalan PSC to its own benefit in order to 
secure statewide parliamentary approval for the highly contentious reform of the Catalan 
autonomy statute.  The Catalan government and parliament, including the PSC, had ‘set the 
agenda’ by proposing a radical revision of the regional statute, but the status of the  PSC as a 
formally distinct party enabled the governing PSOE to take some distance from this draft 
statute. Eventually, the central government successfully managed to water it down and 
threatened to cooperate with the CiU instead. In this case at least where more autonomy for 
the regional branch means quasi independence, it has not been paralleled by a stronger say in 
the politics of the statewide party. Even so, it is assumed that Spanish Prime Minister 
Zapatero has been instrumental in the ‘unseating’ of Pascal Maragall as President of the 
Catalan government. Such intrusive behavior of the PSOE in PSC matters runs against the 
common assumption of PSC autonomy.  
Finally, the effects of institutional asymmetry can also be felt in the campaign 
messages of statewide parties in devolved elections. The issue of whether Scottish, Welsh or 
Northern Irish autonomy should be extended concerns only a relatively small part of the 
electorate (even if it requires a decision of the Westminster parliament) whereas in Spain the 
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issue of regional autonomy affects the entire electorate. Therefore, in the UK statewide parties 
tend to give more attention to the issue of institutional regionalism and regional culture (‘the 
regionalist issue’) in regional elections compared to statewide elections, whereas in Spain 
statewide parties emphasize the regionalist issue more in statewide than in regional elections.  
In sum, we can conclude that how statewide parties organize territorially reflects how 
the state is organized, but only partially so. Not all statewide parties which operate in the 
same territorial context may adjust their organizational structure or campaign strategies in the 
same way. Or, as Hopkin puts it, parties have their own internal organizational inertias. 
Furthermore, how they respond may derive from a set of unrelated variables: the broader 
dynamics of party competition, other institutional variables (for instance, a change in electoral 
rules for instance), or the legacy of party ideology, variables to which we turn next.   
 
[B] Explaining variations in the territorial organization or strategy of statewide parties: Party 
Ideology and Party Development  
 
 So far, the analysis made clear that not all statewide parties adapt themselves in 
identical ways to the multi-leveled nature of party competition. In the introduction we focused 
on three potential explanatory variables which remain relatively stable across the lifespan of a 
party: ideology, party development and party type. We briefly discuss the effect of the first 
two of these variables on the territorial organization and strategies of statewide parties.2   
 
[C] Party Ideology  
 
We first assumed that party ideology serves as an important factor to explain the 
extent to which statewide parties are willing to embrace a federal type of party organization or 
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vary their campaign content. In states which have decentralized in recent decades, the internal 
organization of a party can sometimes be considered as a pre-figuration of a desired state 
structure, instead of as a reflection of the actual state structure. The ‘federal’ party structures 
of the British Liberals and the Spanish IU clearly illustrate this. Similarly, the internal 
structure of the Spanish PSOE bears more resemblance to a federal institutional design than 
the more centralized structure of PP, reflecting the PSOE’s stance in favor of a ‘federal’ 
Spain. On the whole, so we hypothesized in the introduction, Conservative and Labour 
ideologies are the least accommodative to recognize territorial differentiation within the state, 
while Liberal and Christian-Democratic ideologies are more favorable to territorial autonomy. 
The evidence only partially supports this assumption.  
We take a look at the Conservative parties (of which there are two in our sample: the 
Conservatives in Britain and the Partido Popular (PP) in Spain) first. Fabre and Méndez-Lago 
show that while the British Conservatives were the least supportive of devolution at the time 
of the devolution referendums in 1997, they are certainly not the most centrally organized of 
the British statewide parties. For instance, the chairman or deputy chairman of the Scottish 
and Welsh Conservative branches are members of the statewide party executive; the regional 
branches have more than a consultative input in drafting the general election manifestos and 
they are entirely free to choose their own leaders. Regional branches in the Labour Party are 
comparatively weaker. In his contribution Bradbury demonstrates that the statewide 
Conservative Party seems to have interfered less in the process of candidate selection for 
general and devolved elections than the Labour Party. This somewhat higher level of regional 
autonomy is paralleled by the territorially more divergent campaign messages issued by the 
Conservatives compared with Labour and even the Liberals. For instance, on the occasion of 
the 1999 Welsh Assembly elections, the Welsh Conservatives strongly supported the Union, 
both with regard to the institutional and cultural dimensions. However, in 2003 the Welsh 
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Conservatives adopted a fairly intense regionalist position, marketing themselves as a more 
‘Wales-friendly’ party. This U-turn – which was not imposed by the statewide party - was 
most conspicuous with regard to promoting the Welsh cultural identity, but it also involved a 
more favorable stance with respect to regional autonomy, notwithstanding the more skeptical 
position of the Conservatives in both the 1997 and 2001 general elections. In comparison, in 
Spain, the Partido Popular is clearly the most centralized of the large statewide parties. Unlike 
in the PSOE, the PP national President can prevent regional party leaders from occupying 
prominent positions within the national executive. Compared with the PSOE the Consejo 
Autonómico is a more recent and also less relevant body for injecting territorial concerns into 
the statewide party. The PP statewide branch is more likely to intervene informally in the 
drafting of provincial candidate lists; in the making of regional coalitions and in safeguarding 
the ‘internal cohesion’ of PP party politics within the autonomous communities. However, as 
for the Conservatives in Britain, we find some inconsistency in the content of their campaign 
messages with regard to the regionalist issue in statewide and regional elections. In statewide 
elections, the PP adopts a low intensity profile in favor of a strong centre, but in regional 
elections the PP takes a somewhat more regionalist position, though always with a large dose 
of ambiguity and without giving the issue much salience. Perhaps, as for the Welsh 
Conservatives, we may ascribe the inconsistency of the Spanish Conservative party to the 
nature of regional party competition which forces them into a more accommodative position 
with regard to the regionalist issue. Furthermore, while the regional PP branches may tend to 
cross-over to the regionalist side in regional elections, they also maintain a very low intensity 
– in line with their more centralist creed - and almost never surpass the PSOE which is 
ideologically more inclined towards decentralization. Overall, the PP regional manifestos 
diverge less from each other than the PSOE manifestos which may be due to a larger degree 
of central coordination or oversight by the PP statewide party branch. 
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Similarly, where Labour Parties compete against Christian-Democrats (as in Germany 
or Italy), the more ‘centralized’ nature of the former cannot always be taken as given. As 
discussed before, Detterbeck and Jeffery have shown that the German SPD was the least 
decentralized of the statewide parties in 1949, yet by 2007, its party organizational structures 
looked similar to that of the CDU. On the other hand, we find more evidence for the less 
centralized nature of the Christian-Democrats in Italy and Belgium. For instance, Hopkin, in 
his comparative treatment of the Italian statewide parties, illustrates the larger dependence of 
the DCI (Christian-Democrats) from regional and especially local support. In contrast, the 
national executive of the Socialist PSI was less dependent on similar support networks for 
intra party decision-making. Indeed, the PSI is perhaps the only example of a statewide party 
which centralized (under Craxi’s leadership between 1970 and 1990), while the Italian state 
moved into a more decentralizing direction. Finally, the Belgian case provides some indirect 
support for our hypothesis, insofar as the Belgian Socialist Party was the last of the three 
formerly statewide parties to split along linguistic lines, about a decade after the Christian-
Democrats were the first party to break up.  
 Finally, we observe a similarly inconsistent pattern when comparing the two Liberal 
and both of the Communist or far-left wing parties among our sample. The strong support for 
a federal Britain is also fully reflected in the internal organization of the British Liberals. The 
regional branches of the Liberals are the best represented branches in the statewide party and, 
on paper they have the highest level of autonomy in candidate selection or policymaking. On 
the other hand, the German FDP is not more decentralized than the German Social-Democrats 
or Christian-Democrats. Similarly, although we expected Communist or far-left parties to 
adopt a centralized organizational structure, only the Italian Communists (PCI) fulfill this 
expectation. This is so notwithstanding a limited degree of decentralization since the late 
1980s and especially 1990s (when the party transformed into the PDS). Yet, the contrast with 
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the Spanish IU (United Left) is strong. The IU has defined itself as a ‘federal’ party and has 
entrusted its regional branches with the largest degree of autonomy in candidate selection and 
in developing regional party policy of the Spanish statewide parties. On the other hand, as 
Ştefuriuc has shown, the IU sanctions regional branches that sign coalition deals without a 
priori consent of the statewide party. In this respect the IU is as centralized as the PP. 
 On the basis of the brief comparative reflections on the link between ideology and 
party organizational decentralization, we can conclude that party ideology cannot easily 
predict how parties organize internally, let alone how they diversify their campaign messages 
across the regions: Liberal parties are not necessarily the most decentralized, Socialist parties 
are not necessarily more centralized than Christian-Democratic parties etcetera. However, the 
absence of a clear link is primarily due to the weakness of ‘ideology’ as a solid cross-national 
predictor for a party’s preference with regard to how the state should be organized. There is in 
fact less contradiction between a party’s preference with respect to the territorial organization 
of the state and the territorial organization of the party. For instance, Social Democrats in 
Britain (who support devolution but not federalism), organize themselves in a devolved, 
rather than federal way, whereas Social-Democrats in Germany (who are supportive of the 
German federal state) organize themselves in a federal way. Or, to list another example, the 
Italian Communists were at least in the first years after WW II opposed to devolution or 
decentralization and adopted a very centralized party organization while their Spanish 
counterparts supported a decentralized state from the start and reflected this by organizing 
themselves in some respects as the most decentralized of all Spanish statewide parties. 
Admittedly, the Italian Communists became more supportive of devolution as early as the 
1950s, when their exclusion from governance at the centre became obvious but developed 
some regional strongholds instead. The more important question then is: why is UK Labour 
less favorable to federalism than the German SPD, or why does the Spanish Left support a 
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federal Spain while the Italian communists, at least in the first years after World War II took 
issue with a devolved Italy?  
 
[C] Party Development and Ideology as a Compass  
 
One possible explanation for the divergent preferences of ideologically related parties 
with regard to the territorial structure of the state is their position on this issue when the 
contours of modern party development and competition were set. Hence, the pro-federal 
attitude of the UK Liberals could build upon a tradition of long term Liberal support for 
Home Rule (Ireland), which made it natural for the Liberals to capture this ideological space 
after the Second World War. For similar reasons, the pro-federal attitude of the Spanish 
United Left should not come as a surprise. The party was not formed until 1986, in a context 
when the - at that point somewhat centralizing PSOE – and the highly centralized Popular 
Alliance (later PP) defended a strong centre. The IU filled this void and simultaneously built 
upon a tradition of ‘resistance’ from below inherited from more than forty years of 
dictatorship. Furthermore unlike in Italy, meaningful regional parliaments or governments 
already existed when the IU was established. These regional institutions provided a useful 
opportunity structure from which to build up electoral support and statewide recognition. 
If ideology cannot predict the extent to which statewide parties decentralize – at least 
not cross-nationally - statewide party ideology nonetheless functions as an anchor that 
prevents regional branches from drifting off too far from the statewide positions on 
regionalism. For instance, the comparative manifesto analysis demonstrated that in Spain 
‘regionalism’ features more prominently in general than in regional elections, but it is also 
dealt with in a more ambiguous way. In regional elections the Spanish statewide parties, and 
particularly PSOE, are more explicit in their policy choices, mostly in an autonomist 
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direction. Since they may face strong competition of autonomist parties who exclusively 
address the electorate of the region, they reduce the level of ambiguity with regard to the 
institutional and identity components of regionalism. However, the difference with statewide 
elections is most substantial with regard to identity politics. A similar tendency was found in 
the UK, albeit that the regionalist issue received clearly more attention here in devolved than 
in UK elections. Yet as is in Spain, the manifestos for devolved elections particularly 
emphasized regional identity matters more than institutional matters. The more restrained 
attitude of statewide parties in supporting more regional autonomy compared with regional 
identity matters was also confirmed by a separate discourse analysis of the UK manifestos 
which showed that references to Britain are particularly scarce in the regional manifestos of 
state-wide parties. In sum, statewide parties counterbalance a moderately or ambiguously 
regionalist profile on the institutional dimension with the assertion of a strong identification 
with the region; a logical outcome since the political consequences of supporting regional 
identity and culture for the statewide party are small, whereas demands for more regional 
autonomy generate immediate political implications and are more likely to contradict the 
ideology and policies of the central party. 
   
[B] Explaining variations in the territorial organization or strategy of statewide parties: 
incumbency, leadership and institutional reform 
 
Ideological change and the institutional development of parties are long term 
processes, not events. Although they can have a profound impact on how parties organize, 
they take time to unfold. In this sense, they are different from relatively short term shifts in 
the territorial allocation of power within a party that come (or go) with more ‘sudden’ events 
such as the election of a party leader (though of course some leaders may remain in place for 
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a decade or even longer and may push through organizational reforms with long lasting 
legacies) or a party’s position in government or in opposition. Such events can affect the 
territorial organization of statewide parties, if possibly only on a temporary basis. We should 
also emphasize that shifts in the balance of power between statewide and regional party 
branches that are linked to incumbency are not normally accompanied by statutory or party 
constitutional changes. Instead they could lead to a situation in which for instance statewide 
party leaders upon assuming central office revert to statutory (disciplinary) mechanisms that 
may have laid dormant when the party was in statewide opposition. More often, pressure or 
influence is conveyed through informal channels. For instance, the ‘clientelistic’ networks in 
Spain and Italy provide opportunities to reward loyal regional party behavior by pledging 
certain types of regional distributive aid to supportive regional party leaders, an instrument 
that cannot be used, or used much less effectively, when the party is in opposition. 
Conversely, the media exposure, access to resources and ability to make and implement 
public policy that comes with regional office strengthens the authority (and therefore also 
likely influence) of regional party leaders in the party as a whole  
 
[C] Incumbency  
 
 Several authors stressed the (temporary) impact of incumbency on recalibrating power 
between the statewide and regional party branches. In the introduction we assumed that 
central office (combined with a position of regional opposition) is most conducive to 
statewide party influence in regional matters, while a position of regional incumbency 
(combined with statewide opposition) is likely to generate the largest degree of regional party 
branch autonomy and influence in the statewide party. Although we have not collected 
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systematic evidence to test this hypothesis for all statewide parties in each of the five West 
Europeans states, several authors provided supporting evidence for these assumptions.  
For instance, in their comparative analysis of the Spanish and British statewide parties, 
Fabre and Mendéz-Lago argue that the statewide party branch of the Spanish Social 
Democrats kept a close eye on its regional party branches when the party was in power at the 
central level during much of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. This was the case 
notwithstanding the influence of regional party barons in the statewide party. Both authors 
(and Bradbury) also attribute some of the more interfering tendencies of the British Labour 
Party to its uninterrupted control of Westminster since 1997. The interference of Labour in the 
process of candidate selection, especially on the occasion of the first devolved elections in 
1999, illustrate the party’s concern to uphold a ‘uniform’ party message across the country as 
a whole. Earlier, we suggested that the bad results for Labour in these elections, especially in 
Wales, could be attributed to such ‘muddling’ into regional party matters. However, these 
‘founding’ elections took place without a ‘regional incumbent’ in place. The role of Labour as 
a party in office at the regional level hereafter strengthened the capacity and legitimacy of its 
regional party branches to fight or prevent similar displays of interventionism when selecting 
candidates for devolved elections in 2003. Furthermore, we assume that if Labour had been in 
central opposition, it would have been less inclined to supervise regional party matters. 
The role of incumbency can also serve as an alternative explanation for the more 
limited divergence in campaign profiles for Labour in comparison with the other British 
statewide parties or for the PP in comparison with the PSOE. We initially assumed that 
statewide parties that are more centralized are less likely to tolerate territorially divergent 
campaign strategies than statewide parties with a more decentralized party organization. We 
found some evidence to support this assumption, but only in the Spanish case. The PSOE is 
ostensibly more decentralized than the PP and, perhaps as a result, its profiles on the 
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regionalist issue are the most territorially divergent. However, a similarly consistent pattern 
was not found for the UK.  For instance, the divergence between the issue profiles of the 
manifestos of the Liberal Democrats proved to be smaller than the divergence for the 
Conservative party, notwithstanding the more decentralized party organization of the Liberal-
Democrats. These findings could be explained by the incumbency status of Labour. The larger 
strategic leeway which the PSOE branches appear to have enjoyed may well have been due to 
that party’s role in central opposition at the time of the 2001/2003 regional elections. This is 
consistent with the UK findings where Labour - as a party in central office – appeared to have 
tolerated less divergence in its issue profiles than the Conservatives who were in opposition at 
both levels, while the Liberal Democrats (who were in office at the regional level alone) 
occupied an intermediate position. 
In their chapter, Detterbeck and Jeffery clearly show how regional incumbency, 
especially when it is combined with a role in central opposition, strengthens the influence of 
regional party leaders in the statewide party executive. This applies especially to the Social-
Democrats and Christian-Democrats who (unlike the smaller coalition partners) can 
frequently lay claim to the most coveted post in Land politics: that of the Minister-president. 
Minister-Presidents are almost certainly members ex officio of the federal party executive and 
through their prominent role in the Bundesrat, or possibly even the bicameral Concertation 
Committee, they are bound to develop a strong ‘federal’ profile. Particularly after long 
periods in federal opposition, statewide party branches, such as that of the SPD in 1998, tend 
to recruit from several of their (formerly) regional party leaders to fill up ministerial posts in 
the federal cabinet. As a result the contingent of regional party leaders in the state-wide party 
presidium (i.e. the ‘decision-making core’ of the statewide party executive) usually shrinks 
substantially shortly after a party’s assumes central office (Lehmbruch 2000; Swenden 2004). 
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The same tendency has been observed in the CDU after it was elected into federal power in 
1982. 
 
[C] Leadership  
 
As argued above, statewide and/or regional leadership affects the relative strength of 
the statewide and regional party branches. For instance, the identification of Forza Italia with 
Silvio Berlusconi has been a strong centralizing force. The status of Kohl in the German CDU 
or of Felipe Gonzalez in the Spanish PSOE, at least during the first terms of their reign in 
central office may also have had a temporary centralizing effect. Conversely, the presence of 
regional barons within the Spanish Social Democrats, or the personal authority of Donald 
Dewar in the Labour Party or of Manuel Fraga in the Spanish Conservative party (PP) 
entrusted these regional leaders with a disproportionate level of influence in the statewide 
party. In the case of Dewar and Fraga, their personal history as influential ministers at the 
statewide level (in Fraga’s case even as a founding member of the Popular Party) helped to 
maintain significant channels of influence at that level when becoming respectively First 
Minister of Scotland or President of the Galician government.    
 
[C] Extra and Intra-Party institutional reform 
 
Lastly, the relative strength of the central and regional party levels can be affected by 
institutional changes that have little or nothing to do with (de)centralization. Such changes 
can take place within the state and/or within the party. For instance, in their contributions, 
Hopkin and Bradbury discuss the effect of changing the electoral system on party 
(de)centralization, especially in the process of candidate selection. In 1993, the Italian 
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electoral system transformed from a largely proportional to a largely majoritarian one. 
However, the creation of single member electoral districts did not decentralize power within 
the statewide parties. On the contrary, the continued fragmentation of the party system 
compelled parties to form pre-electoral alliances to support each others candidates in single 
member contests. ‘This enhanced the role of parties’ national leadership in candidate 
selection, since reciprocal arrangements of désistement’ require coordination at a higher level 
than the electoral district’ (Hopkin: xxx). Or, as Bradbury shows, the parallel existence of 
constituency and list candidates raised new challenges for British parties in selecting 
candidates for Scottish and Welsh devolved elections, even if in this case, the level of 
statewide party interference more or less remained identical for selecting both sets of 
candidates. Another institutional measure that was raised in this volume is the direct election 
of regional presidents in Italy since 1995. This increased the legitimacy and profile of regional 
executive leaders and thereby strengthened their influence in the statewide party, even in 
highly centralized parties such as Forza Italia (as the influence of Lombardian regional 
president Formigoni attests).  
Shifts in the relative influence of the regional party branches can also emerge as an 
(unintended) side effect of changing decision-making rules within a party. For instance, as 
Fabre and Mendez demonstrate, the introduction of individual secret ballot for the election of 
the party executive and secretary general of the PSOE reduced the capacity of regional party 
leaders to lobby for their preferred candidates. This was the case in 2000, when regional party 
leader José Bono lost the election for PSOE secretary general to Rodríguez Zapatero, 
notwithstanding the support of the former among a majority of the regional party leaders.   
 
[A] Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe: concluding impressions and which 
way from here?   
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This volume brought together a number of contributions that focused on the territorial 
integration of the multi-level party system and the organization and strategies of statewide 
parties with respect to campaigning, policy-making or coalition building at the central and 
regional levels. What are in a nutshell the main conclusions that can be drawn from this 
research and where do we go from here?    
 
Readers who were hoping to find unambiguous correlations or causal relations 
between the integration of the multi-level party system and the territorial organization and 
strategies of statewide parties may feel somewhat disappointed. In fact, the contributions 
show that there is no Grand Theory to explain the organizational or campaign strategy of 
statewide parties which operate in a multi-level electoral context. Statewide parties do not 
react in uniform ways to territorial party competition or shifts in authority migration within 
the state. Indeed, the assumption that we can simply measure ‘federalism by measuring 
parties’ as Riker once claimed is as straightforward as it is wrong (Riker 1975: 137). Not all 
statewide parties within a state adapt to territorial politics in similar ways. Some statewide 
parties may wish to hold a tight grip on the regional party branches even if it means adjusting 
campaign messages to specific regional desires. A statewide party that leaves its regional 
branches with too much autonomy risks becoming a bifurcated party, as has been the faith of 
several Canadian parties (Dyck 1997). Conversely a statewide party that holds too tight a grip 
on its regionalist branches risks falling into oblivion or spark the breakaway of a regional 
party branch. Statewide parties, do not provide uniform answers to this strategic paradox. 
However, there are some generalizations (arguably of lower theoretical ambition) that are 
worth reiterating.  
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First, we found a correlation between the domestic preferences of statewide party with 
regard to what the state structure should look like and their own organizational template. 
Cross-nationally, this works as a better predictor than party ideology, since not all Social-
Democrats, Conservatives or Communists oppose decentralization and not all Liberal or 
Christian-Democrats favor it. Where parties stand often depends on where they stood on these 
issues when parties institutionalized and the party system was ‘locked in’. On the other hand, 
parties can drift on the ‘centre-periphery’ axis of competition as much as they have drifted on 
the left-right axis.   
Second, where the territorial design of the state enables regional party leaders to exert 
a strong influence in the politics of the centre, regional party branches also tend to assume a 
significant role in statewide party politics and retain a considerable level of regional 
autonomy. On the other hand, where the territorial design of the state does not provide the 
same mechanisms of ‘intra-state federalism’ (Smiley and Watts 1985), the position of the 
regional branches in the centre tends to be weaker as well. Where co-operation between both 
levels is nonetheless required, for instance due to a large amount of central framework laws as 
in Spain, regional party branches will be more inclined to follow a congruent logic in regional 
coalition building or policy-making if this could help to strengthen their access and influence 
at the statewide level. In such a context, to opt for a confrontational strategy is the more risky 
alternative. 
Third, perhaps the most consistent centralizing logic within statewide parties stems 
from incumbency, especially when the party is in government at the central level. In this 
regard our findings entirely support the assumed hypotheses.  
Finally, irrespective of where they stand on the left-right scale or how strong the 
regionalist competitors may be, the dominant strategy of statewide parties in regional 
elections is to evade the issue of regional autonomy and adapt a more regionalist profile by 
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playing the regional identity card instead. Only the case of the Welsh Conservatives provides 
some (temporary) evidence of a statewide party which adapted a centralist adversarial strategy 
in order to harm the success of Labour party against its most significant (and equally left-
wing) competitor, Plaid Cymru.  
 
Notwithstanding these findings, it is obvious that our work has only just begun and 
that many questions require further elaboration for which we hope we have ‘wetted’ the 
appetite of many political scientists.     
For instance, we (re)considered the nationalization of the party system hypothesis with 
respect to Belgium, Spain and Germany. This analysis could be extended to include most of 
the other West European states. A comprehensive database should incorporate the ‘multi-level 
party systems’ for all West European federal or regionalized states, i.e. also include 
developments in the regional party systems and their interaction with the statewide party 
system. Similarly, we questioned the direction of Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) assumed 
causal relationship between the (de)centralization of the state and the (de)nationaliztion of the 
statewide party system on the basis of the Belgian, German and Spanish examples. Also here, 
there is scope to test this relationship among a wider number of states. For instance, since 
early 2008, the scholarly community has access to a database which systematically measures 
patterns of authority migration for 42 democracies since 1950 (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 
2008). The ‘regional authority index’ that is introduced in this study captures variations in the 
degree of shared and self rule for each of these 42 democracies. As such it is a more refined 
and arguably more accurate measurement of regional institutional power than indices that 
have relied solely on levels of regional expenditure decentralization (Rodden 2004). The 
regional authority indices (longitudinally and cross-nationally) could be linked to indices 
which capture the (de)nationalization of the multi-level party system, enabling a more 
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rigorous testing of the relationship between authority migration and the integration of the 
multi-level party system. Yet, our research agenda would not only be advanced by providing 
more large N statistical analyses of the type described above; testing for the effect of 
ideology, incumbency, the institutional environment in which the party was formed and 
developed on party strategy also requires delving into the complex network of intra-party 
relations and dynamics. Such studies require extensive elite interviewing and documental 
research, ideally on as vast a number of cases as possible. 
 To conclude, the study of territorial party politics in Western Europe and beyond has 
only just begun. We set the framework and the various contributions provided preliminary 
answers based on some of the most significant federal or regionalized states in Western 
Europe. The questions that were raised here show how the territorial dimension of party 
politics can be analyzed through a comparative framework and why scholars of party politics 
should not neglect the importance of this regional dimension, even if their scholarly interest 
remains with developments at the statewide level (or even supra-national) level alone. 
 
ENDNOTES  
Endnotes have now been moved to a separate section in front of the bibliography  
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